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In Abercrombie case, Supreme Court should 
protect religious freedom 
Requiring job applicants to state their faith-based observances undermines 
the rights of religious minorities 
February 26, 2015 1:00PM ET 
by Lauren Carasik   @LCarasik 
The U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments yesterday in a case brought by the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against Abercrombie & 
Fitch. The EEOC claims the retailer’s decision not to hire 17-year-old Muslim 
applicant Samantha Elauf constituted discrimination. Elauf wore a headscarf 
during a job interview in 2008. Abercrombie did not offer Elauf the job because 
her hijab violated the store’s “look policy,” designed to uphold the retailer’s 
preppy brand. 
The court will now decide whether job applicants must provide direct and explicit 
notice of their need for accommodation of their religious observances or 
practices. But such a strict standard would undermine instead of safeguard the 
rights of religious minorities. Requiring applicants to identify and articulate 
potential conflicts between their faith and company policies during the application 
process would put them at a disadvantage. Instead, employers should state any 
job requirements up front so that prospective employees can disclose potential 
religious conflicts. 
The case will be decided in a climate of growing anti-Muslim sentiment. 
Employers can visually identify certain religious dress and grooming practices, 
rendering Muslims particularly vulnerable to discrimination. While the competitive 
nature of employment makes subtle bias hard to discern and harder to prove, 
claims of religious bias have doubled in the past seven years. 
Shifting the burden 
Abercrombie claims Elauf did not tell the hiring manager, Heather Cooke, her 
headscarf was obligated by religious beliefs. But Cooke correctly assumed that it 
was. She initially recommended Elauf for a sales-floor position but subsequently 
lowered her score in the “appearance and sense of style” category after another 
manager told Cooke that Elauf’s hijab violated company policy. 
Elauf filed a religious discrimination complaint with the EEOC, which brought suit 
against the clothing chain in a U.S. District Court in Oklahoma. Elauf did not 
disclose that the hijab was required by her faith or request a deviation from the 
company’s policy prohibiting headgear because she was unaware of the conflict. 
The EEOC argues that the company knew Elauf wore the hijab as part of her 
religious practice and failed to inform her of its policy, making it impossible for her 
to request a religious accommodation. 
The District Court sided with the EEOC and awarded Elauf damages. The 10th 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision in 2013. The appeals court held 
that employers must have “particularized, actual knowledge,” not merely notice, 
of the need for a religious accommodation and the notice must come directly 
from the employee. In a dissenting opinion, Judge David Ebel agreed that 
ordinarily, an employee has superior knowledge of a potential conflict and 
therefore bears the responsibility to initiate the request for accommodation. But 
here, Abercrombie was aware of “a credible potential conflict between its policies 
and the job applicant’s religious practices.” In such cases, Ebel said,”the 
employer has a duty to inquire into this potential conflict.”  
Abercrombie maintains its policy is religion-neutral and that worker 
noncompliance “inaccurately represents the brand, causes consumer confusion, 
fails to perform an essential function of the position and ultimately damages the 
brand.” But the company has since changed its policy banning religious 
headscarves after several similar lawsuits. 
‘The reason that she was rejected was because you assumed she 
was going to do this every day, and the only reason why she 
would do it every day is because she had a religious reason.’ 
Justice Samuel Alito 
The retailer contends that relieving employees from the responsibility of asserting 
their faith-based requirements leaves the employer guessing, which may 
contribute to religious stereotyping. But the hiring process is vital to gaining 
employment. It is also a stage in which applicants have little knowledge about 
employers’ policies to identify potential conflicts. And employees may be 
understandably reluctant to assert their religious rights when they are competing 
for a job. If anything, shifting the responsibility to prospective employees 
encourages employers to cultivate a willful ignorance of applicant’s religious 
preferences, even when they are manifest, in order to avoid liability. 
The suit was brought under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which requires 
employers to accommodate the religious observances and practices of 
employees unless doing so would cause an undue burden. The law is intended 
to protect people whose religious observances conflict with mainstream cultural 
norms from having to choose between their employment and their beliefs. This is 
particularly important Muslims, Jews and Sikhs, who are disproportionately 
targeted because some of their grooming and dress observances are readily 
visible.  
Deference to religious rights 
The Supreme Court’s most recent jurisprudence on religious rights has been 
deferential. Last May the court held that a Christian prayer before a town council 
meeting was constitutionally permissible. A month later, in a 5-4 decision 
in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, the court ruled that for-profit companies are 
entitled to a religious exemption from providing contraceptive coverage under the 
Affordable Care Act. Last month the court unanimously upheld a Muslim 
inmate’s request to grow a short beard under the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act. The practice violates Arkansas prison regulations, which prohibit facial hair. 
The court rejected the state’s argument that beards presented a security threat 
that could not be reasonably overcome. 
In this case, the court once again appears poised to rule in favor of religious 
rights. The questioning from the justices during oral argument suggested that the 
court sympathizes with the argument that Elauf was at an informational 
disadvantage about the potential conflict and that job applicants are particularly 
vulnerable. 
“Maybe she's just having a bad hair day so she comes in with a headscarf, but 
she doesn’t have any religious reason for doing it,” Justice Samuel Alito said at 
the hearing on Wednesday. “Would you reject her for that? No. The reason that 
she was rejected was because you assumed she was going to do this every day 
and the only reason why she would do it every day is because she had a 
religious reason.” 
A ruling requiring prospective employees to provide explicit notice of a conflict 
between company policies and religious practices might be easier to administer 
and more business-friendly. But it won’t protect those who are unaware of 
company policies that infringe on their religious practices or are uncomfortable 
asserting their rights when they are most vulnerable during the hiring process. If 
the court truly wants to protect job applicants and employees from having to 
choose between a job and the tenets of their faith, requiring explicit and direct 
notice of a conflict undermines that goal. 
Lauren Carasik is a clinical professor of law and the director of the international human rights clinic at the Western 
New England University School of Law. 
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera America's editorial 
policy. 
 
